Ethereum Bulls

On Friday morning, June 17, 2016, a 25-year-old American named Griff Green woke in a small Saxon town to his phone screaming at him. He was community manager for The DAO, the most hyped smart-contract project ever built, and his Slack was telling him that roughly eight million dollars an hour was pouring out of the thing he had helped launch.^[1] Down the hall, his boss Christoph Jentzsch | Mormon, father of five, the DAO's lead developer | was being handed a phone by his wife. His brother Simon was on the line. Something is wrong, she said.^[1]

Seven thousand miles away in Shanghai, a 22-year-old named Vitalik Buterin opened Skype and typed a question to Ethereum's core developers: Hey, is this normal?^[2]

It was not normal. It was the end of one version of Ethereum and the beginning of another. Over the next 34 days, a community that had declared itself an answer to the cowardice of bailouts would hold a referendum on whether it believed its own founding words. It would steelman its way through a question that has no clean answer and still doesn't: when the code works exactly as written and the outcome is catastrophic, which one of those facts is the law? The choice they made in July 2016 created modern Ethereum. The choice a stubborn minority refused to make created Ethereum Classic. Both chains are still running. The argument has never really ended.

A fund built by code

To understand why the stakes felt existential, rewind to DevCon1 in London, November 2015. Christoph Jentzsch, then a soft-spoken former Ethereum Foundation lead tester, walked on stage and introduced a concept audacious enough to sound like a prank. An organization would exist only as code on the Ethereum blockchain: no CEO, no board, no physical address, no lawyers. Token holders would vote. Smart contracts would execute. A machine would run a venture fund.^[3]

The vehicle Jentzsch built at his German startup Slock.it, with his brother Simon and former Ethereum communications chief Stephan Tual, went live on April 30, 2016. The creation phase ran for 28 days. By the time the door shut on May 28, The DAO had absorbed roughly 12.7 million ETH from more than 11,000 investors, worth about $150 million at prevailing prices, the largest crowdfunding event in history to that point and, crucially, about 14% of all ether then in existence.^[4]

Eleven curators held a whitelisting multisig: Buterin, Gavin Wood, Vlad Zamfir, Alex Van de Sande, essentially the Ethereum pantheon.^[4] The pitch, recited on stages and in Slack, was that code was better than humans, more neutral, less corrupt, unstoppable. The unspoken corollary, which nobody enunciated cleanly until it mattered, was that code was only as good as the human who wrote it.

The warnings nobody wanted

The warnings came in waves, and the waves got louder. On May 27, 2016, Dino Mark, Vlad Zamfir (a DAO curator), and Cornell's Emin Gün Sirer published A Call for a Temporary Moratorium on The DAO on Hacking Distributed, cataloging a bestiary of incentive flaws and governance traps.^[5] On June 10, Solidity's own creator, Christian Reitwießner, published a cautionary note on the Ethereum blog warning that some of what the community had been treating as best practice was hardening into anti-pattern.^[6]

On June 12, five days before the attack, Stephan Tual wrote a blog post acknowledging a class of recursive-call bug and assuring the community that "no DAO funds are at risk."^[7] The Slock.it team had begun a patch. The curators were preparing a proposal. A vote was coming. The patch was not quite ready.

The vulnerability, once you see it, is almost funny. The splitDAO function sent your ether before it updated your internal balance to zero.^[8] Any address that received ether could, during the receive, call back into splitDAO again, and again, and again, each time looking freshly entitled, each time collecting. A contract with a callback and a loop could multiply itself against the DAO's balance like a mirror held against a mirror. The attacker would later call this, in a letter that nobody could quite authenticate, "the feature where splitting is rewarded with additional ether." That framing would matter later.

Seven and a half hours

The attacker moved on June 8 by creating Proposal #59, titled Lonely, so Lonely, the shell required to trigger a split.^[9] The proposal sat out its mandatory debate period. Tokens were positioned. The wallet was funded. At 03:34:48 UTC on Friday, June 17, 2016, the first exploit transaction landed.^[9]

Each call split the DAO's funds twenty to thirty times per transaction, bounded only by the block gas limit. The attacker repeated the sequence roughly 250 times from two addresses. For about seven and a half hours, ether poured out of The DAO into a child DAO at a rate of roughly $8 million per hour, while ETH dropped from about $21.50 toward $13 on Poloniex in front of anyone watching a chart.^[10]

In Mittweida, the small Baroque town in Saxony where the Jentzsch family had lived since the 1500s, Griff Green woke to messages.^[1] He posted to The DAO's Slack the sentence that would become the episode's unofficial epigraph: "The DAO is being attacked. It has been going on for 3-4 hours, it is draining ETH at a rapid rate. This is not a drill."^[11]

Down the hall, Jentzsch, woken just after 8 a.m. local time, moved to his first-floor office and lay down on the beige carpet, trying to slow his breathing. A man who had battled anxiety and insomnia for months leading up to the launch now felt, of all things, a small flicker of relief. At that moment, he would later tell a reporter, I realized immediately: The DAO is over.^[1]

In Shanghai, Vitalik pinged the core devs, assuming at first there had to be a reasonable explanation.^[2] Over the next half hour, it became clear the unthinkable was happening. At 11:00:23 UTC, the attacker voluntarily stopped.^[9] Thirteen minutes later, Vitalik's CRITICAL UPDATE Re: DAO Vulnerability appeared on blog.ethereum.org. The post reassured that "Ethereum itself is perfectly safe" and proposed a soft fork, explicitly "with NO ROLLBACK; no transactions or blocks will be reversed."^[12] It was not a bailout, he insisted. It was a freeze. The difference would matter, or not, depending on whom you asked.

One detail, engineered into The DAO by its own creators, became the community's great mercy: the drained ether was not actually gone. It was trapped in a child DAO, bound by the same 27-day debate window that dissenting token holders were meant to use to exit gracefully. The earliest the attacker could cash out was July 14.^[13] The community had about four weeks to decide what it believed.

A letter, a counter-attack, a mirror

The next morning, a message appeared claiming to be from the attacker. The digital signature never quite verified, and serious developers dismissed it as a likely hoax, but the argument it made would be quoted back at the Ethereum Foundation for a decade.^[14] "I have carefully examined the code of The DAO and decided to participate after finding the feature where splitting is rewarded with additional ether," the letter read. "I have made use of this feature and have rightfully claimed 3,641,694 ether... I am making use of this explicitly coded feature as per the smart contract terms and my law firm has advised me that my action is fully compliant." The letter then quoted back, verbatim, The DAO's own marketing disclaimer, the one informing investors that "The DAO's code controls and sets forth all terms of The DAO Creation."^[15]

While the letter was circulating, a cluster of developers assembled in a private Skype chat and decided, with astonishing speed, that the only way to beat an attacker using a reentrancy bug was to become attackers themselves. Green, Alex Van de Sande, Jordi Baylina, Lefteris Karapetsas and others | they eventually called themselves the Robin Hood Group, or the White Hat Group | prepared to use the exact same exploit against the remaining DAO to rescue its contents into child DAOs they controlled.^[16] On June 21, they executed. A transfer of roughly 7.2 million ETH swept into safe addresses.^[17] Van de Sande announced it with the appropriate gallows humor: "DAO IS BEING SECURELY DRAINED. DO NOT PANIC."^[14] Green would later describe sleeping on a mattress with a baseball bat in front of the door, fearing what would happen if someone came for the private keys. Van de Sande put the ethics plainly: "If you see a burning building and you break in to save the cat that's inside, I don't think anyone will press charges against you for trespassing."^[18]

That they had to use the same exploit was a philosophical mirror nobody wanted to hold up. If reentrancy was theft, every rescuer in the Skype chat was a thief. If reentrancy was a feature | the feature where splitting is rewarded | then the attacker had no case to answer, and neither did his pursuers. Either way, both sides had just demonstrated that the code was, in fact, exactly what it said it was.

The argument no one could win cleanly

For the next four weeks, the Ethereum community held the most serious governance argument its young history had yet staged. The positions cut across friendships and founding teams.

The case for intervening was a case for proportion. A quarter of the circulating supply was in motion. More than eleven thousand ordinary people had put real money into a thing their neighbors had told them was safe. The network was less than a year old. Every major legal and financial system in history has emergency overrides. Bitcoin itself had reorganized the chain in March 2013. Immutability, from this angle, was a value held by a community, not an idol the community had to feed. Vitalik would later put it in the tone of someone who had thought about it for years: "Immutability by itself is pretty worthless if all that you're making immutable is running off a cliff. In order for principles to be valuable, they have to serve some kind of social purpose."^[2] Forking to drain a single broken application into a withdrawal contract did not require reversing arbitrary transactions; it required a one-time irregular state change, narrowly scoped, widely signaled.

The case against was a case for meaning. A blockchain without immutability was a slow, expensive database with better marketing. Smart contracts were valuable precisely because their outcomes were binding, irrespective of who disliked the outcome. The attacker had not hacked Ethereum; he had used The DAO exactly as it was written. Code is law was not a slogan. It was the product. Reversing this transaction, even once, even with good intentions, even for ordinary people, drew a line in a place with no natural edges. What was the next loss threshold? Who decided? Why was The DAO worth a fork, when every lost wallet since Genesis was not? Charles Hoskinson, the Ethereum co-founder who had left the year before, put it in a sentence that has lived in the ETC discourse ever since: "When you turn the driver's keys over from a Ferrari to a machine, you have to sometimes accept that the Ferrari is going to kill people. And you have to accept those consequences."^[19] Hoskinson also named the conflict of interest nobody on the pro-fork side wanted to name: many of the loudest voices for intervention were themselves DAO token holders.

There was an additional, uncomfortable fact. The attacker's letter, real or not, was right about one thing. The disclaimer on The DAO's website explicitly subordinated every human-readable promise to whatever the code did. Every investor who signed up had, in a strict legalistic sense, consented to that hierarchy. The Ethereum Foundation was now arguing, in effect, that this contract language had been a kind of aspirational fiction.

Sirer, who had warned about the bug in May, articulated the position most honestly. He supported the hard fork as "the quickest, cleanest, simplest way of putting this mess behind us," and added, in the same breath, that he would be "perfectly happy with no fork as well."^[20] Years later he was blunter: Code is not law, code is buggy, law is law. It was a judgment call. Serious people could disagree.

The soft fork that wasn't

The community first tried the middle path. Geth v1.4.8 shipped a soft fork around June 24: any transaction touching DAO accounts would be rejected, freezing the loot without rewriting history.^[21] Then, on the morning of June 28, Tjaden Hess, River Keefer, and Sirer published a post on Hacking Distributed calmly demonstrating that the soft fork opened a devastating denial-of-service attack. A bad actor could force miners running the soft fork to execute expensive transactions, then end with a DAO call that invalidated the whole transaction. Miners would eat the work, collect no fees, and watch miners not running the soft fork collect the fees instead.^[22] The soft fork would economically extinguish itself within days of being turned on. It was abandoned.

That left the hard fork, and the hard fork required a signal. On July 15, the Ethereum Foundation published To fork or not to fork, launched the carbonvote, and released Geth v1.4.10 and Parity v1.2.0 with the fork logic ready.^[23] The vote was crude: ETH holders sent zero-ETH transactions to one of two addresses, paying only gas. The window was barely a day. Roughly 80% of the votes cast favored the fork, but only about 5.5% of total ETH participated, and a single address contributed roughly a quarter of the YES weight. It was less a referendum than a weather vane held up on a gusty evening. It was enough.

Block 1,920,000

On July 20, 2016, at block 1,920,000, a special state transition swept all ether from The DAO, its extraBalance, the attacker's child DAO and the Robin Hood Group's white-hat children into a single new contract at address 0xbf4ed7b2...: WithdrawDAO. Its Solidity was almost embarrassingly short, a few lines letting any DAO token holder redeem at 1 ETH per 100 DAO tokens. Vitalik's Hard Fork Completed post reported that roughly 12 million ETH had been rerouted, that about 85% of miners had followed the forked chain, and that within hours about 4.5 million ETH had already been claimed.^[24] Almost everyone in the room expected the original chain to die within days of starvation.

Almost everyone was wrong. A small constellation of miners, ideologues, and opportunists refused to run the new client. A pseudonymous Russian crypto-media figure calling himself Arvicco had already published, on July 11, a Crypto-Decentralist Manifesto naming three non-negotiable properties | openness, neutrality, immutability | and declaring that "all attempts to violate any of the key blockchain characteristics should be fought."^[25] Chinese mining operator Chandler Guo turned hashpower toward the unforked chain.

On July 23, Poloniex listed Ethereum Classic under the ticker ETC; within a day it was the exchange's most active pair. Within days, Kraken and Bitfinex followed with their own ETC markets, credited balances, and published guidance on replay protection.^[26] That exchange support, more than any manifesto, is what turned dissent into a priced continuation chain with liquidity and a user base. By August 13, the Ethereum Classic Declaration of Independence was live, framing its community as "a community of sovereign individuals" who stood by the unforked ledger as "absolute truth."^[27]

The attacker, and the regulator

The attacker, patient as ever, waited until late October. Sitting on roughly 3.6 million ETC on the unforked chain, his wallet awoke and began routing funds through ShapeShift, in small chunks to avoid detection, converting ETC into about 282 BTC before ShapeShift finally blocked the flow.^[28] In February 2022, investigative journalist Laura Shin, working with a previously secret Chainalysis de-mixing tool for Wasabi Wallet CoinJoins, followed the remaining trail through the privacy coin Grin, through an Amazon Singapore server hosting nodes named grin.toby.ai and ln.toby.ai, to Toby Hoenisch, a 36-year-old Austrian programmer who had co-founded the crypto debit-card project TenX.^[29] Hoenisch replied that Shin's conclusions were "factually inaccurate," promised a rebuttal, and never delivered one.^[30] No charges have ever been filed, in any jurisdiction, against anyone for the DAO hack.

The regulators arrived later, and they arrived definitively. On July 25, 2017, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued its Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a)... The DAO, concluding that DAO tokens were securities under U.S. federal law.^[4] Applying the Howey framework, the Commission cut past the rhetoric of autonomy to the economic reality: token holders had invested money in a common enterprise with the expectation of profit, and those profits were dependent on the managerial and entrepreneurial efforts of Slock.it's founders and the curators. The report's central point was devastatingly simple. Automation does not erase securities law when the thing being automated still looks like an investment contract. The Commission declined to bring charges but formally put the industry on notice. Almost every token-sale framework that followed | from the sharpening of SAFTs to the eventual Ripple litigation | sits downstream of those pages.

The rule the exception proved

In November 2017, a GitHub user known as devops199 accidentally triggered a vulnerability in Parity's multisig wallet library, freezing roughly 513,774 ETH | worth over $150 million at the time, north of $300 million months later | across 587 wallets, including around $90 million belonging to Gavin Wood's own Polkadot.^[31] EIP-999 was proposed to unfreeze them. It lost. Years later, the funds remain frozen.^[32] The DAO had set the norm by exception. Protocol-level catastrophes might justify a fork. Application-level losses would not.

Ethereum Classic kept proving the cost of minority-chain life. A 51% attack in January 2019 double-spent over $1.1 million. Three more attacks in August 2020 reorganized thousands of blocks; the third arrived on the fourth anniversary of the fork.^[33] ETC patched, renamed its hash algorithm, and when Ethereum transitioned to Proof of Stake at The Merge on September 15, 2022, made a point of staying on Proof of Work. As of April 2026, ETC trades around $8 with a market cap near $1.3 billion, a rounding error against Ethereum but, stubbornly, still there.^[34] A monument to the road not taken, still lit.

The ledger neither side can close

Three related things happened in the summer of 2016, and it is worth naming them separately.

A community protected real people from a real theft, at the cost of its purest founding principle. A community violated its purest founding principle, to protect real people from a real theft. And a community discovered that social consensus, applied deliberately, is the substrate beneath the code | which is either the most honest thing blockchains can admit about themselves, or the admission that renders everything else theater, depending on where you sit.

Christoph Jentzsch, who watched his project collapse from a beige carpet in Saxony, later said the DAO's collapse created Ethereum as it is today. He meant it generously. He was also, in a quieter sense, correct. The modern Ethereum culture of caution, of not forking for Parity, of audit norms, of an entire professional security industry born out of 2016, descends directly from the week everyone spent arguing whether to undo what the code had done. The very dormant ether that sat in the old curator multisig for a decade was redeployed in January 2026 as TheDAO Security Fund, a roughly $220 million endowment for Ethereum security research, governed by a new seven-person curator board that includes Buterin, Green, and Baylina.^[35] The original wound became the beginning of the body's immune system.

Somewhere, a wallet containing thousands of ether's worth of laundered value sits under an alias, or under a name, or under nothing at all. Somewhere, a Declaration of Independence signed by sovereign individuals is still being quoted on a PoW chain that its critics expected to expire within weeks. The argument the summer of 2016 started is not a history lesson. It is the operating question of every blockchain, still open, still unresolved, and, if you take the evidence seriously, genuinely unresolvable by any answer short of a choice.

They chose. So did the people who refused to. Both chains are still here. That, in the end, is the most Ethereum answer of all.

// references

1. CoinDesk, The $55M Hack That Almost Brought Ethereum Down (2020)
   https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2020/09/17/the-55m-hack-that-almost-brought-ethereum-down
2. AMBCrypto, Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin delves into infamous DAO hack
   https://eng.ambcrypto.com/ethereum-co-founder-vitalik-buterin-delves-into-infamous-dao-hack/
3. Slock.it Blog (Christoph Jentzsch), The History of the DAO and Lessons Learned
   https://medium.com/slock-it-blog/the-history-of-the-dao-and-lessons-learned-d06740f8cfa5
4. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO (Release No. 81207, July 25, 2017)
   https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf
5. Dino Mark, Vlad Zamfir, Emin Gün Sirer, A Call for a Temporary Moratorium on The DAO (May 27, 2016)
   https://hackingdistributed.com/2016/05/27/dao-call-for-moratorium/
6. Christian Reitwießner, Smart Contract Security, Ethereum Foundation Blog (June 10, 2016)
   https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/10/smart-contract-security
7. Stephan Tual, No DAO Funds at Risk Following the Ethereum Smart Contract Recursive Call Bug Discovery (June 12, 2016)
   https://web.archive.org/web/20160614013335/https://blog.slock.it/no-dao-funds-at-risk-following-the-ethereum-smart-contract-recursive-call-bug-discovery-29f482d348b
8. The DAO source, DAO.sol, showing the external call before internal state update in splitDAO()
   https://github.com/TheDAO/DAO-1.0/blob/master/DAO.sol#L2972-L3085
9. slacknation, DAO hack timeline (Medium, 2016)
   https://medium.com/@slacknation/dao-hack-timeline-823e5a18e894
10. CoinDesk, The DAO Attacked: Code Issue Leads to $60 Million Ether Theft (June 17, 2016)
    https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2016/06/17/the-dao-attacked-code-issue-leads-to-60-million-ether-theft
11. Cointelegraph, DAO Potentially Hacked, Millions of Ether May Be Stolen, Griff Green Says
    https://cointelegraph.com/news/dao-potentially-hacked-millions-of-ether-may-be-stolen-griff-green-says
12. Vitalik Buterin, CRITICAL UPDATE Re: DAO Vulnerability, Ethereum Foundation Blog (June 17, 2016)
    https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability
13. BuzzFeed News, The Thief Who Stole $50 Million In Ether Can't Spend His Money
    https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/josephbernstein/you-just-stole-50-million-in-cryptocurrency-now-how-the-hell
14. VICE, The Biggest Hacker Whodunnit of the Summer
    https://www.vice.com/en/article/pgkzqm/the-biggest-hacker-whodunnit-of-the-summer
15. An Open Letter to the DAO Community (purported attacker statement), archived at jebmo.posthaven.com
    https://jebmo.posthaven.com/an-open-letter-to-the-dao-community-attacker-explains
16. CoinDesk, CoinDesk Turns 10: 2016 | How The DAO Hack Changed Ethereum and Crypto (2023)
    https://www.coindesk.com/consensus-magazine/2023/05/09/coindesk-turns-10-how-the-dao-hack-changed-ethereum-and-crypto
17. Wikipedia, The DAO (organization)
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_DAO_(organization)
18. VICE Motherboard, How Coders Hacked Back to 'Rescue' $208 Million in Ethereum
    https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/qvp5b3/how-ethereum-coders-hacked-back-to-rescue-dollar208-million-in-ethereum
19. CoinJournal, Ethereum co-founder Hoskinson on hard-forking DAO
    https://coinjournal.net/news/ethereum-co-founder-hard-forking-dao/
20. Yahoo Finance / CoinDesk, CoinDesk Live Recap: The DAO Hack Is Still a Mystery
    https://finance.yahoo.com/news/coindesk-live-recap-dao-hack-031057720.html
21. Vitalik Buterin, DAO Wars: Your voice on the soft-fork dilemma, Ethereum Foundation Blog (June 24, 2016)
    https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/24/dao-wars-youre-voice-soft-fork-dilemma
22. Ethereum Foundation, Security Alert: DoS Vulnerability in the Soft Fork (June 28, 2016)
    https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/28/security-alert-dos-vulnerability-in-the-soft-fork
23. Ethereum Foundation, To fork or not to fork (July 15, 2016)
    https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/07/15/to-fork-or-not-to-fork
24. Ethereum Foundation, Hard Fork Completed (July 20, 2016)
    https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/07/20/hard-fork-completed
25. Arvicco, A Crypto-Decentralist Manifesto (July 11, 2016), preserved in Ethereum Classic reference archive
    https://ethereum-classic-guide.readthedocs.io/en/latest/docs/appendices/crypto_decen_man.html
26. Combined exchange listings:
    Poloniex, via The Merkle | https://themerkle.com/ethereum-classic-is-now-trading-on-poloniex/
    Kraken, On the Ethereum hard fork | https://blog.kraken.com/news/on-the-ethereum-hard-fork
    Kraken, Classic Ether (ETC) Markets | https://blog.kraken.com/product/kraken-opens-classic-ether-etc-markets-and
    Bitfinex, Ethereum Classic Launch | https://blog.bitfinex.com/announcements/ethereum-classic-launch/
27. The Ethereum Classic Declaration of Independence (August 13, 2016)
    https://ethereumclassic.org/ETC_Declaration_of_Independence.pdf
28. FinTech Ranking, The DAO Hacker Cashes Out (October 2016)
    https://fintechranking.com/2016/10/29/the-dao-hacker-cashes-out/
29. Laura Shin, Exclusive: Crypto's Biggest Whodunnit: Who Was Behind the 2016 DAO Attack on Ethereum?, Unchained (February 2022)
    https://unchainedcrypto.com/exclusive-cryptos-biggest-whodunnit-who-was-behind-the-2016-dao-attack-on-ethereum/
30. Decrypt, Former Crypto CEO Denies Responsibility for $11 Billion Ethereum DAO Hack
    https://decrypt.co/93547/crypto-ceo-denies-11-billion-ethereum-dao-hack
31. Sophos News, $300m... deleted! How a tiny bug flushed away a fortune (November 2017)
    https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2017/11/09/300m-deleted-how-a-tiny-bug-flushed-away-a-fortune/
32. Cointelegraph, EIP-999: Why a Vote to Release Parity Locked Funds Evoked So Much Controversy
    https://cointelegraph.com/news/eip-999-why-a-vote-to-release-parity-locked-funds-evoked-so-much-controversy
33. The Hacker News, Ethereum Classic (ETC) Hit by Double-Spend Attack Worth $1.1 Million (2019)
    https://thehackernews.com/2019/01/ethereum-double-spend-attack.html
    Coinbase Blog, Coinbase's perspective on the recent Ethereum Classic (ETC) double spend incidents
    https://www.coinbase.com/blog/coinbases-perspective-on-the-recent-ethereum-classic-etc-double-spend
34. CoinMarketCap, Ethereum Classic price today
    https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ethereum-classic/
35. The Block, 'The DAO is back!': Ethereum dev Griff Green to use unclaimed hack funds for new security fund
    https://www.theblock.co/post/387697/the-dao-back-ethereum-dev-griff-green-use-unclaimed-hack-funds-new-ethereum-security
    Crypto Valley Journal, The DAO relaunches as Ethereum Security Fund with 220 million dollars
    https://cryptovalleyjournal.com/hot-topics/news/the-dao-relaunches-as-ethereum-security-fund-with-220-million-dollars/